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House Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces Holds Hearing on the Proposed Fiscal 2014 Defense Authorization as it Relates to Missile Defense Programs

ROGERS:

This hearing of the Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces will come to order. I want to -- to thank the folks who are here to participate and other -- other people in attendance.

I apologize for the delay. We were told votes were going to start at 3, and obviously they didn't and they postponed it till 5 so it's just something we don't have control over.

But in the interest of time, I'm going to skip my opening statement and just submit it for the record and recognize the ranking member, Mr. Cooper, for any opening statement he may have?

COOPER:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have no opening statement and look forward to hearing from the witnesses.

ROGERS:

Great.

We have a great panel today. We have the Honorable Madelyn Creedon, assistant secretary of defense for global strategic affairs, Office of Secretary of Defense; Vice Admiral James Syring, U.S. Navy, director of Missile Defense Agency; and the Honorable Michael Gilmore, director, operational test and evaluation, Office of Secretary of Defense.

And we will start with Ms. Creedon. You're recognized for five minutes?

CREEDON:

Thank you very much.

Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper, and members of the subcommittee, thank you very much for the opportunity to testify today in support of the department's fiscal year 2014 budget request for missile defense. Today I would like to highlight the progress that we have had on some key policy priorities, particularly the recent decisions to strengthen homeland missile defense.

The U.S. homeland is currently protected against potential limited ICBM attacks from both North Korea and Iran by the ground-based missile defense -- midcourse defense system, or GMD. As stated in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review, we are committed to maintaining an advantageous position vis-a-vis those threats. To do so requires continued improvement to the GMD system, including performance enhancements to the ground-based interceptors and the deployment of new sensors along with upgrades to the command and control network.

To stay ahead of the threat, as we have said that we would do -- in this case, the growing threat from North Korea -- President Obama recently decided to strengthen the U.S. homeland missile defense posture. This decision was announced by the secretary on March 15th and DOD is now in the process of implementing the decision. The decision also recognized the delay to the SM-3 2B program, largely as the result of funding cuts in prior years and the continuing resolution.

As Secretary Hagel announced, DOD will add 14 interceptors to the GMD system for a total of 44 deployed GBIs by 2017, and deploy a second TPY-2 radar to Japan. Deployment of the second radar to Japan will provide improved early warning and tracking of any missile launched from North Korea at the United States or Japan and will improve both homeland and regional defenses.

As you know, we had planned to employ an SM-3 2B interceptor for the defense of the United States from land-based sites in Europe, but the deployment schedule had been delayed to at least 2022, as I mentioned, due to the cuts. As a result, we decided to shift resources from this program to the GBI program to cover the cost of the additional 14 GBIs and to the technology development line in the Missile Defense Agency to develop new advanced kill vehicles and booster technology.

These decisions will allow us to improve our defenses against missiles from Iran sooner than we otherwise would have while also providing additional protection from the North Korean threat.

To be clear, there is no money in the FY '14 budget for the SM-3 2B program and we are no longer planning for phase four of the European Phased Adaptive Approach. As a result of much discussion, our allies understand and accept this decision and we have reinforced with them that our commitment to phases one through three of the EPAA remains ironclad.

We have also worked with other regional allies and partners in the Asia Pacific and the Middle East to improve cooperation and enhanced regional missile defenses. We have deployed a Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD, battery to Guam as a precautionary move to strengthen our defense posture against the growing North Korean regional ballistic missile threat. The deployment strengthens our defense capabilities for American forces and citizens in the U.S. territory of Guam.

This deployment is an example of the benefit derived from our investments in mobile missile defense systems, which can be deployed worldwide as required.

We also continue to work with our GCC partners on regional missile defense cooperation, and of course, we continue to support Israel and its missile defense systems, including the Arrow co-development program.

The president's budget for FY '14 reflects DOD's goals of retaining the flexibility to adjust and enhance our defenses as the threat and as technologies evolve. Our most vital security commitments -- the defense of the United States and the protection of our allies and partners and our forces around the world -- demand nothing less.

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.

ROGERS:

I thank you.

And, Admiral Syring, you're recognized for up to five minutes to summarize your opening statement?

SYRING:

Thank you, sir.

Good afternoon, Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper, distinguished members of the subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you for the first time as the director of the Missile Defense Agency.

My priorities are to continue strong support of the warfighter, support what we have deployed, and deliver more capability to the combatant commanders.

We are taking several steps over -- over the next few years to implement Secretary Hagel's guidance to strengthen our homeland defense. First among those steps is -- is returning the redesigned ground-based interceptor to flight testing later this year. The successful controlled flight test of the redesigned GBI earlier this year gives me great

confidence we have addressed the causes of the end game failure in the December 2010 test.

Later this month we will demonstrate the improvements made to the GBI fleet over the last four-and-a-half years in an intercept test of the first generation operational Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle, the first such test since December of '08. We are increasing the operational fleet of GBIs from 30 to 44 by 2017, and -- and this will involve the relocation of GBIs and the refurbishment and reactivation of Missile Field 1 in Alaska.

We have already begun to evaluate locations in the continental United States to determine a site suitable for possible future deployment of our homeland defense interceptors. Also, in order to provide more robust coverage for the homeland defense, this year we are working with our Japanese partners to deploy a second TPY-2 radar to Japan.

We will continue to strengthen our regional defenses and funding to operate and sustain command and control management and communications and TPY-2 radar's fielded sites, and we will deliver more interceptors for THAAD and Aegis BMD. MDA will continue to fund the upgrades to phase one of the European Phased Adaptive Approach, and we proceed on schedule and on budget to complete the Aegis Ashore sites in Romania by 2015 and Poland by 2018.

Mr. Chairman, when I arrived at the Missile Defense Agency last November I was impressed with the organization and professionalism of the workforce. They are highly motivated and the very best in the world at what they do. It's an honor to serve with them every day.

I ask that my written statement be accepted into the record and I look forward to answering the committee's questions. Thank you.

ROGERS:

Thank you, Admiral.

Mr. Gilmore, you're recognized for up to five minutes to summarize your opening statement?

GILMORE:

Given my responsibilities, I just simply want to emphasize in my opening statement that we are -- we have conducted and we're continuing to conduct tests that -- that incorporate increasing amounts of operational realism and, therefore, complexity. An example of that is so-called FTI, or flight test integrated-01 that was conducted late last

year. It involved the coordinated intercepts -- near simultaneous intercepts by Aegis, THAAD, and Patriot of ballistic missiles and air-breathing (ph) threats.

This was a -- a very important test for a number of reasons, not the least of which because the combatant commands had extensive participation in this test and it was used to develop techniques -- tactics, techniques, and procedures that are being applied in U.S. Central Command today.

We're going to be conducting later this year the first full-blown operational test -- multisystem operational test -- FTO-01, that will involve Aegis and the THAAD conducting -- or performing layered defense.

And Admiral Syring mentioned that we have conducted a test that's very promising this year with ground-based missile defense, indicates that the problems that caused the previous intercept failure probably have been corrected. In all likelihood we'll be doing -- that was with the Capability Enhancement II kill vehicle.

In all likelihood, early in FY '14 there probably will be a decision to conduct an intercept test with the CE-II kill vehicle. And we will be also conducting, probably later this month, an intercept test with the Capability Enhancement I kill vehicle, and that's important to do, as well, because the CE-I kill vehicles will compose a majority of the fleet of GBIs for some time to come, and we need to continue to test those under realistic conditions, as well.

The first intercept of an -- of a true ICBM target remains scheduled for the fourth quarter of FY '15. That is unchanged from the last three integrated master test plans. And we will be conducting increasingly complex and realistic tests of the ground-based missile defense system thereafter -- after this year, and including in -- in FY '15, and after that point with ICBM targets, and we will be conducting salvos and multiple simultaneous engagements in order, again, to incorporate increasing amounts of operational realism in the tests.

And it's only by doing that that we can give the combatant commanders and the National Command Authority the information they need to understand the performance of the system.

And so, in summary I would simply say that I support very strongly the deliberate and rigorous test program that Admiral Syring is executing. It enables learning, and that learning is what's essential from testing. And in fact, I think the value of the tests -- and this may sound somewhat counterintuitive, but the value of the tests is most demonstrated by the failures that we've -- that we've found -- you know, the failure modes that we've found by conducting those tests in Aegis and ground-based missile defense over the last couple of years, because those failures would not have been found if we didn't do that testing and relied solely on modeling and simulation.

So thank you and I'll be happy to answer your questions.

ROGERS:

I thank you. And I also want to, you know, take time and let you know how much I appreciate you all preparing for this hearing and being here. I know it takes a lot of time for you all to get ready for these things and -- and it's appreciated by us.

I'll recognize myself first for questions.

Admiral Syring, I was very pleased that the DOD has gone back to the Bush program of preparing to have 44 ground-based midcourse defense interceptors, but I'm concerned about the -- the -- what I'm understanding is the plan for purchasing the additional 14 interceptors -- two per year for seven years.

Seems to me there'd be a -- a more efficient way to purchase those. Can you tell me what your thoughts are about how you might approach that differently?

SYRING:

Yes, sir. I'll answer the question with two parts. The first gate that I must pass through is a successful return to intercept flight later this year and -- with the CE-II configuration, in terms of we've got to have that success; it underpins the entire strategy that we're now on, and the criticality of demonstrating fly-before-you-buy and -- and not restarting delivery and integration of the current GBIs that are under contract is step one.

Step two would be, once we're successful, as part of the next budget submit to work with the department and then with our Congress on some ideas to more efficiently by those in terms of economic order quantity, long lead, potentially multiyear procurement authority based on the stability of what we're able to demonstrate through flight testing this year and next year.

ROGERS:

I know you say you want to wait till -- till after this test and you're forming next year's budget, but can't you go ahead and have some people be comparing those options and see which one, in the meantime, would be most practical and -- and cost saving so that you're not trying to start that up next year? I'd hope you would be doing that...

SYRING:

Yes, sir. We're doing that analysis now.

ROGERS:

Great.

Ms. Creedon, the president's cut the missile defense budget each and every year he's been in office. It isn't possible to merely cast blame on the Budget Control Act, as some of his steepest cuts came prior to that act, which, by the way, nowhere states that funds need to be cut out of our missile defenses. Have any of our combatant commanders reduced their interest in missile defense capabilities to justify these devastating cuts?

CREEDON:

The majority of these cuts and reductions are really associated with programs that have been terminated over the course of time, so many of these programs, such as the airborne laser program, proved to be technically more challenging than initially thought. So the bulk of these reductions really is associated with these sort of high-risk types of programs and -- and have not cut into the actual -- the actual meat of the program.

In fact, this year, having cut -- having canceled another one of these programs that were fairly high-risk, we've been able to fund an additional 14 GBIs and provide additional protection to the homeland. So yes, the combatant commanders continue to have high interest, but the support that we've been able to provide through the budgets that have been submitted are more than sufficient to both stay ahead of the threat and ensure that the U.S. homeland is adequately protected.

ROGERS:

Well, it just seems inconsistent, when you look at the -- the threat in North Korea and what's happening with Iran, and China's buildup of their regional capability, that -- that we ought to not be spending less; if anything, should be enhancing our spending, particularly given the modernization challenges I've got.

Now, you talked about the radar -- I mean, the laser system. Have you all -- and by that I mean the administration -- taken the view that directed energy is not an area we should be focused on?

CREEDON:

Not at all. The decision was really with respect to the specific program, the airborne laser program. And in fact, there is a substantial research and development program associated with directed energy concepts currently funded in the missile defense budget.

ROGERS:

I just think that's an area we really need to -- and I've talked with Admiral Syring about that -- I think we really need to focus a lot more on that.

Also, Ms. Creedon, I'm -- I'm concerned about Secretary Kerry's comments to the Chinese while in that country. He said to the Chinese that if they would help rein in North Korea and their behavior that it -- it could have a quid pro quo of withdraw of some of the U.S. assets in the region.

Hypothetically, if North Korea abandoned its missile and nuclear programs tomorrow would the U.S. withdraw its missile defense assets from Asia -- for example, its two radar systems in Japan?

CREEDON:

Obviously hypotheticals are -- are always difficult, but if -- if North Korea were to abandon everything, you know, completely denuclearize in a verifiable fashion, completely walk away from any of its long-range missile systems, it would, of course, have -- have an impact on the U.S., but largely with respect to the U.S. homeland missile defense programs, which is really what is geared -- what is what the North Korean threat is driving.

So it's really the U.S. -- so the regional -- the regional concepts will continue to be there as -- you know, those -- those are a different -- a different aspect. Plus, the regional focus is also largely provided by assets that are mobile and transportable, so as I mentioned in my statement, these are the sorts of assets that we can -- we can move to wherever the threat is. So if the threat were in the Asia Pacific they would be there; if the threat were somewhere else we could -- we could move those assets there.

But I would certainly welcome the denuclearization and the demissilization, if that's a word, of North Korea.

ROGERS:

Well, and I would, too. I'm not holding my breath, but I -- I would, too. But I would remind folks that China's still over there and it's a rough neighborhood, so we -- we need to be mindful of that when we start -- you know, when the -- first of all, the secretary can't make those decisions, you know. If he wants to -- to withdraw anything it's going to take money and he has to get the Congress to approve it, so I'd -- I'd like not to have to read those kind of things in the paper, but I do want to remind everybody that it's not just North Korea in that neighborhood that's a problem.

And with that, I'll yield to the ranking member for any questions he may have?

COOPER:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know it's the job of the opposite position party to be critical of the administration but I think it's also important to stress those areas where we agree as well as the areas of disagreement, and I noted in your opening statement that you submitted for the record that you largely agree with the administration on their cancellation of the PTSS project and the SM-3 Block IIB missile.

So those are significant cost savings for the MDA budget. Those are things that I know in your statement you said, well, maybe the money should be put back into other programs, but still, it's great to have this source of agreement on administration policy on the cancellation of those two programs.

I noted in Admiral Syring's testimony, toward the end on page 20, he said that the impact of sequestration on the program and workforce is significant, and I think that many folks in our military are feeling that in whatever budget they're supervising.

You also go on to say that you plan to work with the department to submit an above-threshold reprogramming request as part of the department's larger request this year. I was wondering if the admiral could give us any idea of what some areas of reprogramming that you might be most interested in at this point.

SYRING:

Sir, thank you -- thank you for the question. First, there is an impact to the work I do and the workforce of sequestration as those cuts came down, and what we've done as part of our reprogramming request that will be submitted to the department is offer a better way and better method to take some of those cuts to mitigate and -- and keep my highest-priority -- my highest-priority issues fully funded and on schedule.

Sir, I'll -- I'll share those details with you once I'm allowed to -- to submit them via the -- via the comptroller once they're -- once they're approved, but I can assure you that what I have offered is the -- is a better use and better -- better way to -- to spread the cuts and preserve my top priorities for homeland regional and -- and regional defense.

COOPER:

Well, I appreciate the seriousness with which you undertake your assignment, and there is a move afoot among my colleagues on the other side of the aisle to perhaps offer \$250 million extra for ground-based interceptors for procurement and for MILCON, and it seems like the focus would be on the third site. And I was wondering if you really need

additional funding or authority in FY '14 beyond the budget request, and if -- would this money be able to be spent in this upcoming fiscal year?

SYRING:

Sir, the -- the -- the first part of that answer is, as you know, I'm -- I'm conducting a very extensive siting study, as directed by the NDAA, and that -- that process is ongoing, and as those recommendations are -- are briefed to the department we'll -- we'll come forward with those recommendations by the end of the year.

With that, I will be developing a contingency plan, which means analysis of the East Coast site, and I call it more globally the CONUS interceptor site, coupled with some studies and direction I've gotten from both General Kehler and General Jacoby to come back to them with a holistic approach to the BMDS architecture, given PTSS cancellation, given the 2B cancellation.

So I'd like to look at the CONUS interceptor site in that context and that larger kill chain end-to-end and provide recommendations across the board in terms of the -- the benefit of the CONUS interceptor site and the benefit of other parts of our kill chain end-to-end, sir.

COOPER:

Thank you. And I would appreciate, not for this hearing, but if you could supply a classified answer to the question about our capability to provide shoot-look-shoot capability for coverage of the United States that would be very helpful.

SYRING:

Yes, Sir.

COOPER:

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

ROGERS:

I thank the gentleman.

Chair now recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Wilson, for five minutes?

WILSON:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you all for being here today, and we all appreciate your service for our country.

Admiral Syring, the United States has had no boost-phase missile defense program since approximately 2009, when the Obama administration terminated the airborne laser, ABL, and kinetic energy interceptor, KEI. I noted in a recent unclassified slide that the Missile Defense Agency had no programs designed to defeat a missile in the boost phase.

Sir, aren't there obvious advantages to engaging a missile in this phase of the flight at the beginning, such as pre-countermeasure and decoy release?

SYRING:

Sir, the -- the boost-phase capability has been long chronicled on the benefit that it might give. The problem that we've had in terms of fielding boost-phase capability is -- is getting close enough to the threat, and -- and certainly the SM-3 2B program was going to be a first-shot capability against the threat, but again, sir, the -- the -- the predication of getting a first shot was all based on what velocity could we achieve with that missile, and technologically it was too challenging and too costly and too long, in terms of the schedule, for us to get there.

WILSON:

And getting to know the location of the threat with the satellite technology we have, with the other technology and the intelligence, hopefully, we have, I -- I would hope that we would -- could be pretty precise on where a potential attack could come. Do you feel that way, or...

SYRING:

Sir, we have -- we have coverage against a limited ICBM attack against Iran and North Korea, and I'll talk more about that as the questions come. But we do have a good capability in terms of detection of launch, and then ... of the track to the proper systems within the BMDS. It's very important and we do have that overhead and -- and organic sensor coverage today.

WILSON:

Good. Well, I certainly want to reassure the American people we are -- have extraordinary monitoring capability. Shouldn't we take a look at what options are possible for boost-phase missile defense?

SYRING:

Sir, as -- as -- as part of the studies that I'm doing for the two combatant commanders where I get my requirements for we are -- we are looking at what technology is available, boost-phase and even left-of-launch, and -- and I'll -- I'll leave it at that in this forum.

WILSON:

Thank you very much.

And for Dr. Gilmore and Admiral Syring, giving -- given the intelligent (ph) community's current assessment of the developing threats from North Korea and Iran, does the current ground-based missile defense plan still meet requirements? What changes should be made, if any? Will we see any proposed changes in the hedging strategy?

SYRING:

Sir, was that -- was that for me or Ms. Creedon?

WILSON:

Actually, for you and Dr. Gilmore.

GILMORE:

Do you want to go first?

SYRING:

Go ahead, sir.

WILSON:

But I sure appreciate the secretary is here. Thank you. There is life after serving on Capitol Hill.

GILMORE:

I'll let Admiral Syring address the question of what changes might be made -- you know, might be necessary to the acquisition program. I try to stay out of recommending changes to acquisition programs; I just provide test information to the people who make those decisions, otherwise they might think that I'm trying to grind an axe.

From the standpoint of the test program, as I described in my opening statement, the test program for ground-based missile defense is going to be incorporating increasing operational realism, including multiple simultaneous engagements, salvo engagements, and demonstrating performance against countermeasures. And so in that regard I think that the test program is structured to deal with the evolving threat.

People can have debates about when certain kinds of countermeasure might be available to either the North Koreans or the Iranians, assuming that they -- you know, the Iranians developed an ICBM. But, you know, my understanding of those threat projections and the uncertainties that they incorporate is that the test program is appropriately paced in that regard, so I think I'll just leave it at that.

WILSON:

And, Admiral, would you...

SYRING:

Sir, as far as changes to -- to the strategy, I wouldn't -- I wouldn't call them changes; I would call them augmentation details that need to be worked in terms of, given the cancellation of PTSS and 2B, which you've -- which you'll hear from me and what I've shared with several members, is our need to focus on discrimination capability. And to that I mean -- I -- I mean the sensor network, and to that I mean the dual phenomenology of both radar energy and I.R. energy. And in those -- in both of those spectrums, sir, we need to focus and -- and have started to focus, in terms of what that brings to the fight in terms of providing the combatant commanders a better use of their existing resources.

WILSON:

Thank you very much.

ROGERS:

Gentleman's time is expired.

Chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. Garamendi, for five minutes?

GARAMENDI:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And some discussion has already taken place concerning the East Coast missile site, and the question of whether -- first, I guess, to Admiral, if you could tell us the status of the current study that you have underway as a result of last year's NDAA -- what is the status of it? What are you studying?

SYRING:

Sir, we looked at a -- are looking at a wide range of possible locations for the CONUS interceptor site based on criteria that includes proximity to population areas, booster drop zone areas, DOD-controlled land, and -- and performance, frankly, in terms of what -- where is our best location to maximize our opportunity against the threat. Literally hundreds of sites have been considered, and through a ranking and -- and -- and down-select criteria -- that process is ongoing through MDA and then the department and then, you know, eventually results will be announced and further studies will happen at those locations that we neck down to.

But that process is ongoing and very active today.

GARAMENDI:

Could you give us some sense of timeframe as to when the study would narrow it down to two or three different sites and then down to one site?

SYRING:

The rough timeframe that I'm working to is towards the end of the summer, maybe as late as September.

GARAMENDI:

That you will have a preferred site at that time?

SYRING:

That I'll have a -- a preferred three sites at that time to study even further before the end of the year.

GARAMENDI:

And so by the end of the year you will have selected a site?

SYRING:

I'll have recommendations. It won't be my selection. There'd be a recommendation to the department, which will ultimately provide the recommendation to Congress.

GARAMENDI:

OK. And then, assuming that a site has been selected -- or recommended and Congress takes it up -- that'll actually be next year's NDAA that it would be taken up?

SYRING:

Potentially, sir, yes.

GARAMENDI:

So the construction at that site is probably another two or three years off?

SYRING:

The timetable that we're working to is once we -- we decide on a site by the end of this calendar year, 18 to 24 months for an environmental impact study on that site and then site construction and subsequent additional GBI procurements if -- if so dictated by the department and -- and the combatant commander requirement.

GARAMENDI:

OK. So we're looking at a situation where additional expenditures beyond what is already allocated in the 2013 NDAA and continued studies and site environmental work in the 2014 NDAA would be sufficient to meet your schedule?

SYRING:

The resources that are required to do this study -- the -- the siting studies this year and then the environmental impact study have been part and are -- the '14 requirement is part of my budget request in the reprogramming, actually, since that was a late requirement. So those funds will be covered, but it's only study at this point.

GARAMENDI:

I promised my friend next to us that I wouldn't get into another brawl with him on an East Coast missile defense site so I'm just trying to lay out some information that will help us all work through the scheduling of money and whether we tie up a significant amount of money in a -- ahead of what it would actually be required -- of when it would actually be required.

So I'm going to put a direct question to you and -- and hopefully not be engaged too deeply with my colleague over here. Would an additional \$250 million in the 2014 NDAA be of use to you in the process that you have underway?

SYRING:

Not at this time, sir.

GARAMENDI:

Thank you.

I will yield back my time.

ROGERS:

I thank the gentleman.

The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Nugent, for five minutes?

NUGENT:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I want to thank the panel for being here today.

But to the admiral, I -- I want to thank you. A number of members from this committee, you know, sent you a letter urging that the MDA be -- refocus attention on directed energy, particularly as it relates to challenges with our -- our missile -- or our adversaries' missiles capabilities. And first I want to thank you for the response, and I'm encouraged by your plans to develop a next- generation airborne laser system.

But the directed energy budget is so relatively small, and so I'm trying to figure out -- you know, the Army and Navy are -- are being very aggressive, I think, on directed energy capabilities to intercept close-in threats on ground forces and ships, but intercepting ballistic missiles obviously is a great challenge. So I'm trying to figure out, do we have adequate resources to allow us to -- to move to that next level and -- and get out of the -- from the laboratory stage to actually get to where we could deploy?

SYRING:

Sir, it's a fair question. As you know, we have -- we have -- we have two efforts ongoing today at Lawrence Livermore and -- and out at MIT Lincoln Labs, and both show great promise.

And we'll proceed to their first knowledge point in terms of 10 kilowatts, 20 kilowatts, 30 kilowatts over the course of the next two to three to four years. And, sir, as we've refocused our efforts, those demonstrations are critically important to prove the technology and our ability to scale up in power.

Equally important is the platform, and we have talked and I've talked to several of the members about a demonstration on a UAV in several years and the importance of being above the cloud layer to show that I.R. and -- and it's, in -- in particular, directed energy is -- is a benefit to the discrimination problem that I face and -- and the combatant commanders face. And to date, the -- the progress has been promising. As part of the studies that I am doing for both combatant commanders we are looking at this, as I've mentioned to a couple of congressmen in private, to -- to understand the allocation of money, because right now we're --because we're spending less than \$50 million a year on this at this point, and I've been asked by several members to -- to come back and give -- give them my recommendation on is that enough, are we -- are we focused in the right areas, are we focused too slowly or too quickly?

NUGENT:

And I agree with those members, particularly when you look at the ability -- if we could develop a consistent system it's certainly a lot less expensive to do the test at that point than using a kinetic source -- you know, another missile to try to shoot down. So what do we need to do to help resource you, or is -- is \$50 million enough? I mean, it doesn't sound like it would be, but...

SYRING:

Sir, we're -- we're still in the -- in the scale-up demonstration phase at this point to prove the two promising technologies that we're working on -- the DPALs system out at Livermore and then the fiber combined laser at MIT. And as I gain knowledge -- and we're -- we're only going to pass through the first knowledge point here in the next 18 to 24 months...

NUGENT:

That was kind of my question: When do you expect to see some kind of actual testing?

SYRING:

The first knowledge point of that system will be in FY '15 to demonstrate it at a 30-kilowatt level. And then, sir, we can make decisions based on where we are with the physics and the technology, and then more importantly, the packaging and the scaling of that technology to go on a platform, which is -- is equally important.

NUGENT:

And I think the -- the question I heard one of my -- my colleagues ask -- and this is a question I think I -- I tried to allude to earlier is, with additional funds could you move that date up, because obviously if you could move that date closer to where we are today it becomes more cost effective once you do that, obviously, for continuing testing, and would that help? I mean, or -- or is it -- money isn't the issue, it's technology or time, I'm not sure which?

SYRING:

Certainly more people on each -- each concept, in terms of the number that we have today based on the budget reductions that have happened over the last couple years, need to be looked at and will be assessed by myself over the next few months.

NUGENT:

So is the answer more money could hire more researchers to get to a usable platform sooner?

SYRING:

Sir, I need...

NUGENT:

I know it's a tough question...

SYRING:

I need to study that and get back to you.

NUGENT:

If you would, please. Thank you.

And I yield back. Thank you.

ROGERS:

Gentleman's time is expired.

The chair now recognizes the gentlelady from California, Ms. Sanchez, for five minutes?

SANCHEZ:

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

OK, gentlemen. I want to talk about that National Research Council's report -- the 2012 report -- comparing boost-phase ballistic missile defense to other approaches identified. It identified six fundamental principles or precepts of a cost-effective ballistic missile defense.

I want to quote this: "It found the current GMD system deficient with respect to all of these principles." Because of these problems, the NRC recommended an entirely new ground-based missile defense system with new interceptors, radars, and concept of operations.

So why is the administration recommending the purchase of 14 more ground-based interceptors when the NRC found the current system so lacking?

SYRING:

Ma'am, is that for me?

SANCHEZ:

It's for whoever wants to answer that.

SYRING:

Ma'am, the -- the -- the current system we have has -- has had a history -- the last two intercepts have been failures -- FTG-06 and FTG-06A. One was a production quality issue and one was more of a design issue.

We successfully demonstrated the design correction for the last intercept test in a controlled flight in January. It was not an intercept flight but we put it through very aggressive maneuvers in space to prove that the correction in isolation mechanism of the navigation unit had, indeed, been isolated to perform -- to perform as designed in an intercept test.

And based -- based on the analysis of that data that we got back, if we had flown at target it would have been an intercept. So that gives me great confidence that the correction is in place and will work.

That said, I've still got to demonstrate an intercept test later this year, and as I -- as I said previously, it is imperative that before we start buying more GBIs in FY '16 that I come forward with that success and -- and prove that, yes, the -- the new system is -- is -- is, indeed, corrected.

As you know, the -- there is the older version of interceptors that are in the ground today that have successfully flown three of three times, and that those continue to be at the forefront of the combatant commanders' stable of missiles to -- of interceptors to use in case of conflict.

That said, we -- we are -- we are proceeding with fly-before-you-buy. I'm not making any production decisions or spending any money on new GBIs until we've proven that. I have stopped taking delivery of GBIs; I've stopped taking delivery of EKV's that are either on the old contract or the new contract until we have corrected this problem. It underlines everything we are doing.

SANCHEZ:

That's what I wanted to hear.

So saying it a different way, because we had Secretary Hagel make a statement that complete confidence in the GBI interceptors was a prerequisite to deployment of these 14 additional GBI interceptors, specifically, which flight or intercept tests must be successfully conducted and what capabilities must be demonstrated in order to meet Secretary Hagel's stated requirement?

SYRING:

Yes, ma'am. That intercept test today is called the CE- II -- Capability Enhancement II -- intercept test that will be of the vintage of the GBIs that we will procure starting in FY '16.

SANCHEZ:

So the new GBIs?

SYRING:

The new GBI correction will be intercept tested in the first quarter of FY '14 -- later this calendar year.

SANCHEZ:

And that's the only test that you think needs to be passed in order for us to feel confident enough to buy more GBIs?

SYRING:

There'll be an additional intercept test that's in the budget today for later in FY '14, and my -- my guidance in terms of the development of the test plan for Dr. Gilmore has been at least one intercept test per year.

SANCHEZ:

OK, so...

SYRING:

And I can -- I can make some very informed decisions after this intercept test on restarting integration and then informing the new production buy.

SANCHEZ:

So the CE-II capability -- and you had some other names associated with that test -- for the new GBIs -- you think that if you do that one test that you can go ahead and start purchasing the new GBIs? Or, then you said you also have another test on -- in FY '14 that would give you more information. So are you telling me you want to buy those 14 after this test in the fall or are you telling me you're going to wait until FY '14 test -- the second one -- to see if both of those are good?

SYRING:

Ma'am, the -- the problem that we had with the CE-II test back in December of '10 was very isolated to the navigation unit and -- and isolated in a sense that we -- we understood through the data and through ground testing and everything else post-test that it was a very isolated component that is very explainable and repeatable in the ground testing that we did. We proved, through both of those -- especially the December '10 flight test -- success at every stage of flight of the new interceptor.

SANCHEZ:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just wanted to get that for the record because I heard two under Hagel's -- the question I said about Hagel, and now I hear one from the other side. So I think it needs further discussion outside of this hearing. Thank you.

ROGERS:

I thank the gentlelady.

The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Brooks, for five minutes?

BROOKS:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Syring, do you possess any delegated authority by the secretary of defense over foreign disclosures of classified United States missile defense technology?

SYRING:

I am the classification authority for the ballistic missile defense system.

BROOKS:

And have you been asked, since assuming your position, to provide insight about disclosure to Russia of United States missile defense technology?

SYRING:

I have not been asked to declassify anything in terms of disclosing information to Russia.

BROOKS:

Have you been asked for your insight?

SYRING:

I have not been asked for my insight other than questions that have been asked and are asked routinely on what is classified and what is not.

BROOKS:

So as best you can recall, you've had no discussions with anyone, for example, in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, about declassification of any of our missile defense technology with respect to Russia?

SYRING:

I have had discussions with the -- with the secretary of defense policy group on what information is classified and what is not classified, and that guidance -- that information, in terms of what I've provided, has been adhered to 100 percent.

BROOKS:

I'm not sure that you're answering the question, or maybe I'm not phrasing the question properly. Let me give it another crack.

Have you had any discussions not about what information is classified or classified, but instead, have you had any discussions about whether any classified information should become declassified with respect to our missile defense technology in Russia?

SYRING:

Yes, sir. There has been a discussion on -- there has been a discussion on the capability of the current missiles we're building and -- and the velocity at burnout.

BROOKS:

Who were those discussions with?

SYRING:

Sir, they -- they have been discussions within OSD policy up to Dr. Miller.

BROOKS:

Another question for you, Admiral Syring: If you were given complete authority to reprogram funding as you saw best in order to enhance America's national security, where would you focus your resources and overall agency program attention?

SYRING:

My number one priority, sir, would be to -- would be to focus on the discrimination capability of our system.

BROOKS:

Would there be any other reprogramming of funds from one aspect of what you do to any other?

SYRING:

I am currently assessing that and it may be possible.

BROOKS:

The MDA objective simulation framework, or OSF, contract was awarded competitively in fiscal year '12 and was designed to provide flexible and robust solutions to assess the United States' ability to fully protect the homeland as well as provide the damage denial role vital to the success of our military commanders' missions abroad. However, the program has been subjected to a continuing series of budget reductions, restructuring, and program slippages which have undercut the overall OSF program objectives.

Now, I've been informed that there have been an additional cut of \$2.5 million that is requiring an immediate layoff of key technical personnel whose talents are vital to the continued success of OSF. Would you please provide me a thorough review of the history and future funding and plans of the OSF contract at the earliest opportunity? And that can be in writing if you're not able to give it in the little bit of time that we have left.

SYRING:

Yes, sir.

BROOKS:

Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

ROGERS:

Thank the gentleman.

Chair now recognizes Mr. Langevin for five minutes?

LANGEVIN:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank the panel for your testimony today. Some of my questions have been addressed.

I wanted to circle back, though, and Mr. Nugent has talked about -- and questioned about directed energy, and, Admiral, I just had to give you a further opportunity to talk on this topic. How does the FY '14 budget request preserve the investments made in directed energy programs so far and -- and what role overall does MDA see for D.E. capabilities in the future? And I'm very interested in specifics and -- and, you know, how we integrate some of these things into our -- our missile defense capabilities in the long run.

SYRING:

Yes, sir. The funding preserves us on a path to the scheduled demonstration in FY '15 of the two systems that I spoke about east and west, at MIT and Lincoln Lab -- Lawrence Livermore.

More importantly, what I see the value of directed energy to be is to help with the -- the very complex debris scenes and countermeasures that we see coming in the future, in terms of having that capability for discrimination in the kill chain. And I view that as a very -- one of my highest priorities in terms of developing that phenomenology, and the systems that we're demonstrating east and west are critical to the confidence of our ability to one, prove the technology, and then two, to package and put on a platform and demonstration first and then consider even smaller payloads in space, potentially.

LANGEVIN:

Thank you. Well, I think that these investments are important and I hope we're doing our best to preserve them and -- and, you know, continue to see them aggressively develop and hope we integrate it as soon as possible.

Let me turn to the TPY-2 radar issue. In FY '13 NDAA funding for an additional TYP-2 radar was included to meet growing COCOM demands for missile defense. This demand has grown ever since passage of that legislation.

How does MDA intend to continue TPY-2 production? And in the area of RDT&E, what would you identify as your top three to four priorities?

SYRING:

The funds provided in FY '13 for the TPY-2 radar, given -- and my answer to sequestration stands in terms -- there -- there was some impact there in terms of how that cut was taken, but given my reprogram request that's going to go through the Congress, I'm going to find or have proposed a method to -- to fully fund that radar and buy that radar in '13, in terms of what I said to maintain my top priorities intact. So that -- that's step one.

The future of TPY-2s in terms of the forward-based mode will be driven by the combatant commanders and their requirements for TPY-2s in theater. As you know, we're going to -- we're working with the government of Japan and our defense partners in Japan to locate a second TPY-2 to Japan, and -- and that's going to be very, very helpful.

One of the things that I'm working with the Army on is, do we need a seventh THAAD battery, for example, and how can a TPY-2 go with that THAAD battery, and that will be one of the -- one of the items that I consider as part of my '15 budget request working with the Army, as there is a standing requirement for nine THAAD batteries today.

My top priorities in R&D -- and I'll just repeat this again, sir -- is discrimination and development of the discrimination capability, the continued testing and -- and reliability improvements that are critical for the GMD system and the current GBIs. We've incorporated over 20 -- I want to say 24 or 25 improvements to the current CE-I fleet that I'll demonstrate in flight within the next month, and that -- those improvements and those continued -- the continued improvements of the current fleet is -- is part of my R&D request, as well.

So discrimination, GBI testing and reliability, and then finally, we're -- we're -- we're working very hard on the Aegis front in the region to continue to upgrade that capability to meet the requirements of EPAA phase two and three.

LANGEVIN:

Thank you, Admiral.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

ROGERS:

Thank the gentleman.

Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Colorado, Mr. Lamborn, for five minutes?

LAMBORN:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Syring, I was concerned about something you alluded to earlier. I hadn't meant to ask about this but I -- I must.

Given the development of the Iranian threat, maybe as early as 2015, to have intercontinental capability, to -- to see that the western -- or, excuse me, the eastern site is going to have to go through a one-and-a-half to two-year environmental impact statement really bothers me because that puts us past that. Isn't it allowable under the law for the president to waive NEPA for national security purposes, especially if the site development ends up on an existing military facility?

SYRING:

Sir, I'm not -- I'm not -- I'm not in the -- in the details of what we could waive or what -- what -- not waive. My answer on 18 to 24 months was based on the current law and current statute and, frankly, the time period that it's taken us to do past EISs.

LAMBORN:

Well, Admiral, current law and current statute allows for the president to waive an environmental impact statement when we're trying to stave off a -- a threat to our homeland, and I -- I would hope that your advice to him would -- would be to seek that waiver.

Secondly, let me ask about a budget line on the information that we have -- sheet that we have here. Israeli cooperative programs Arrow and David's Sling is going from \$268 million to a request of \$96 million. Why the big drop off there?

SYRING:

Sir, we -- just the stage that we are and in those programs, and we've worked these numbers cooperatively with Israel. It's the requirement that we see in '14.

LAMBORN:

OK, thank you.

Next question I'd like to ask you is, could you explain the priorities that you have on the kill vehicle technology that you would like to develop? I'd just like to get a little better sense of what -- where you're coming from on that.

SYRING:

Yes, sir. The kill vehicle technology is 1990s technology, and in terms of when that design was complete and the components that we have in it, with very little time spent or thought at the time for manufacturing, producibility, and sustainability.

The technology has moved, obviously, 20 years since then and that there's -- there -- there is components within the current kill vehicle that we would like to target near term for upgrade -- the IMU focal plane array, some other areas that might improve with -- improve the inherent organic discrimination capability of the EKV. The goodness -- and - - and there's -- there's great goodness in terms of some of the technology that has been developed as part of the Aegis kinetic warhead, and -- and we think that there's some synergy between the two in terms of components that could be scaled and used in the same way, obviously, with the same hit-to-kill mission that could be of benefit to the EKV.

LAMBORN:

OK. And lastly, can you explain the difference in the overall goals that you have before you of capability development versus technology development? I'd like to hear your thoughts on that.

SYRING:

The biggest technology development that I see is exactly what I've said in terms of discrimination, retro sensing (ph) algorithms, infrared directed energy. There is where I see the technology investment for MDA being in the future.

The balance will be continued to -- continuing to field capability to the warfighter, in terms of THAAD batteries continue, Aegis BMD upgrades continue. The SM-3 1B missile deliveries are -- are ramping up this year and -- and providing that much needed capacity to the warfighter.

So I agree with you, it's a balance between keeping the future, you know, keeping the future in front of us and ahead of the threat versus providing the needed capacity to the warfighter. And certainly as I study that with General Jacoby and General Kehler this year we're looking at that -- that exact problem.

LAMBORN:

OK. Thank you very much and I appreciate the work that you do.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

ROGERS:

Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Franks, for five minutes?

FRANKS:

Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank all of you for being here, for the investment of your lives in the -- in the cause of freedom.

Admiral Syring, I know that you've emphasized significantly discrimination related to our missile defense capability and I know something that's potentially related to that, at least contingently related to it, is the need to improve the kill assessment capability of our GMD system. So I'm going to ask you about four questions in a row here, what I usually don't do, but it gives you an opportunity to emphasize the areas that you think is most important for us to consider.

Are you, first of all, and the commander of NORTHCOM and the commander of STRATCOM, close to any kind of an agreement on the way ahead to improve that capability -- that kill assessment capability? How feasible is it to leverage those current capabilities? To what extent are new capabilities required? And is it feasible that the U.S. should significantly enhance this capability by the end of this decade?

SYRING:

Sir, kill assessment is -- is -- is a very important capability that -- that -- that we're working on, and I -- I do have direction from -- from the -- the commander of NORTHCOM on -- on his priorities for improving kill assessment and other -- frankly, other parts of what I call the assessment chain, in terms of how do we -- where do we need to invest, what can we do near term and what can we do maybe further term to better inform his shot doctrine?

And it's not just -- it's just not kill assessment; there's other parts of that -- of that problem that need to be considered. There's EKV discrimination capability, there's radar

sensing capability, there's I.R. There's a whole list of things that would give him more information for -- for that assessment.

Underlying all this, sir, is the improvement of the GBI reliability and -- and giving him confidence that we -- each interceptor is providing, indeed, the reliability that he counts on. Yes, I am in -- in very near-term discussions with -- with him on that issue.

FRANKS:

Well let me shift gears, then, and -- and ask you, were you satisfied that we had sufficient missiles available to PACOM during this recent escalation in tensions and the threat of -- of medium-range rocket launches by North Korea? You know, I -- I guess I'm concerned that a lot of our missiles were either at stockpiles at home or -- or in other theaters, and -- and are we doing everything that we can to allocate our resources in the best way possible?

SYRING:

Sir, we -- we had -- we had coverage to protect the homeland -- sufficient coverage to protect the homeland across all of our systems -- the Aegis ships that were on station, the GMD system that was on -- is on alert, and then the THAAD battery, as you know, that went to Guam, and that capability that we provided in -- in very short order.

FRANKS:

Well, touching briefly on the old third site -- not -- not the East Coast site, but the -- the site that was once canceled in Poland -- and I'm not sure exactly how much you can say, but given some of the shortcomings of -- of -- of the potential 2B missile to -- to be able to really do the job there, how much impact do you think this has had on Iran's calculus or our ability to provide redundant homeland protection by not having GBIs rather than, at this point, not even the potential of 2Bs in Poland?

SYRING:

Sir, if -- if I can, can I -- can I just speak to the 2B?

FRANKS:

Yes, sir.

SYRING:

Because I was -- I was not here back in -- back in '09 and I would like to keep my answer to the -- to the 2B, and I -- and I referred to this earlier. The technology challenge to get to a velocity of that missile in the time and budget that we had was insurmountable, and -- and there -- there are many other issues that I've talked to you about, but -- but -- but that -- those three reasons alone -- the technical challenge, the cost, and the schedule -- would have driven our ability to field the 2B to 2022 or beyond, and from a schedule standpoint, sir, that -- that wasn't going to cut it.

So the president and Secretary Hagel made the decision to focus on North Korea first, which we're doing with the additional interceptors west in Greely, and then the -- the second part of that focus will be what do we need to do as Iran continues to -- to progress. And, sir, we -- we are studying that in great detail with the combatant commanders.

FRANKS:

Well, so you know, I think you've made every decision correctly; there's no criticism here aimed in your direction at all. I am somewhat concerned -- maybe this is a -- I suppose this is a real intellectual "I told you so" kind of thing related to the GBIs that were once planned there, which would have had sufficient acceleration and -- and -- and speed to -- to -- to be able to give us that redundant protection that now we will not have, and it will not have the ability to change the Iranian calculus, as well.

So, but anyway, glad you're on the job.

Thank you all.

And thank you, Mr. Chairman.

ROGERS:

Thank the gentleman.

Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Turner, for five minutes?

TURNER:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Syring, do you agree with NORTHCOM Commander Jacoby that, quote, "What a third site gives me, whether it's on the East Coast or in an alternate location, would be increased battle space. That means increased opportunity for me to engage threats from either Iran or North Korea." Do you agree with that?

SYRING:

Yes.

TURNER:

Thank you.

I think that's incredibly important as we look to the possibility of an East Coast site, which, of course, would give us that third site option. I was the author of the amendment in the NDAA of last year to establish the East Coast site. The numbers that we've been working with -- \$100 million last year in the NDAA and \$232 million looking at the cost to build the site in six years -- have been based upon what General O'Reilly had told us as we look to, you know, moving forward with -- with this site.

Ms. Creedon, I have a great deal of respect for you but you have to admit at this point that the administration's missile defense policies are in absolute shambles. I have a letter dated April 17th to Barack Obama which I'd like the chair to put into the record that acknowledges that this -- this policy that the administration has established of undoing and then redoing the -- the Bush administration's Alaska site is completely insufficient as a basis for protecting the United States, and I want to do a real quick drive-through of where we are and why we are.

The Bush administration had planned by 2013 that the Alaska site would be completed and that there would be forward-based missiles in Europe, including a radar, and that would be a third site to provide to the doctrine of shoot-look-shoot, which General Jacoby and Admiral Syring -- Syring just said is preferable for protecting the United States. In the context of the national intelligence estimate of the public statements of our intelligence community that the threat from Iran and North Korea to the continental United States from an ICBM attack with a nuclear weapon could be as -- as early as 2015, the administration came and canceled the third site in Europe, significantly reduced the site in Alaska, and said, contrary to all intelligence estimates that were public and that we were receiving, that the threat was slow to emerge so we could wait until 2020 to protect the homeland with a third site, paraded out the phased adaptive approach that had a fourth phase that would include protection of the United States by 2020, one that I opposed because I believe, A, it was going to be late -- there will be a gap between the 2015, what the intelligence community was saying, and 2020; and two, that it looked like it was not going to be achievable because it was a paper system, not something that had yet been completed.

We now see ourselves with, of course, that fourth system being canceled -- that fourth phase being canceled because it would have slipped past 2020 and was not technically feasible. The administration has now gone back and said we'll complete the Alaska site that the administration -- that the Bush administration would have had completed by 2013 with a timeframe of 2017.

But where we are now is that North Korea has moved an -- a missile to a launch pad that our intelligence community says could be an ICBM and could have a nuclear weapon on top of it. And now the administration is saying that we're going to complete Alaska and currently isn't embracing an East Coast site, which would provide what Admiral Syring just said and what Commander Jacoby said is -- is preferable of having a third site for shoot-look-shoot.

Now, the Obama administration had indicated in its missile defense strategy that there needed, in addition to the phased adaptive approach, there needed to be a hedge if the threat was -- was quicker to emerge than -- than this administration's analysis of 2020. Now, I assure you that no one in Congress believed that that hedge was going to be less protection from the homeland; everyone believed that the hedge would be an increased protection.

But now we have it the -- the threat has been quicker to emerge, North Korea actually threatening the United States, and you've canceled the fourth phase of -- of the phased adaptive approach, and you're opposing the East Coast missile defense site, and you've canceled the European forward-based Bush administration missiles, and we have no hedge.

Now, Ms. Creedon, it would have been laughable if the administration had come in five years ago with this plan and said it was going to be sufficient to protect the United States, and now, quite frankly, I believe it's just straight-up dangerous. And my letter to the president of the United States is -- is saying that the current plan for this administration to just build out Alaska doesn't even meet the -- the Obama administration's own standards.

So what's coming next, Ms. Creedon? Are you going to actually dedicate yourself to expanding our missile defense system to protect the homeland?

CREEDON:

Yes, sir. That's exactly what the decision to go to the additional 14 GBIs is...

TURNER:

No, no, no, wait. That's not sufficient. As you know, that was scheduled already under the Bush administration plan to be completed. Saying you're going to go now back and complete what they would have had in the ground by 2013 is not expansion.

What are you going to do to give the third site that Admiral Syring says that we need and that Commander Jacoby says that we need for shoot-look-shoot, which has been the doctrine while all these threats have been emerging? I mean, we're now here, the threats are knocking on our door, and now you're dismantling what would be the important doctrine that we need.

CREEDON:

Let me roll back just a little bit in -- in time just to today and -- and reference back to the discussion that we had earlier about the test program and the challenges that had been associated with the GBIs that were in Alaska, so part of the -- part of the time that -- that we bought by keeping the hedge intact, completing the missile fields, not doing away with the extra six -- the extra six silos in Missile Field 1, has allowed us to continue to improve the capability and the reliability of the GBIs -- both the CE-Is that -- that are there, and now working on the CE-II.

So the CE-II, which was the new kill vehicle, as we all know, had a failure. We've been able to improve that. There's been one test already; there's another test scheduled for the end of the year.

So what we've -- what we bought in that period of time is time to actually fix the GBIs and make them more reliable, because where we were in 2009 was not having the degree of confidence in the GBIs that we needed to have, particularly in the new ones. So with the work that's been done there, the -- all the enhancements to the CE-I that have been done over the course of the last four years, and the work that's going on has increased the capability of those GBIs.

Now with the 14, that is a big step forward. So we have 14 more and they're going to be more capable than they would have been. And this will also help in looking at how we defend against anything that would develop from Iran as well as anything that develops from Korea.

ROGERS:

Thank the lady.

And the gentleman's time is expired.

I do want to -- to accept the letter that he offered for the record -- without objection, so ordered -- and remind you all, we had hoped to have this hearing an hour earlier, which would have given us time for a second round, but they've called us for votes.

So the record will be held open for 10 days. Members may submit questions to you and I'd ask that you return those in writing.

And with that, thank you again for your attendance. This hearing is adjourned.

CQ Transcriptions, May 8, 2013

List of Panel Members and Witnesses PANEL MEMBERS:

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REP. MICHAEL R. TURNER, R-OHIO

REP. TRENT FRANKS, R-ARIZ.

REP. DOUG LAMBORN, R-COLO.

REP. MO BROOKS, R-ALA.

REP. JOHN FLEMING, R-LA.

REP. AUSTIN SCOTT, R-GA.

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